Calendar – External

March 26 2019
8 October 2024
  • Alexandros Theloudis, Tilburg
    08 Oct, 14:00 - 15:30

    Location: R42.2.113

    Oct
    08

    Alexandros Theloudis, Tilburg

    Tuesday, 14:00 - 15:30

    Location: R42.2.113

15 October 2024
  • Gabrielle Fack, PSE
    15 Oct, 14:00 - 15:15

    Homepage

    Title ; The Effect of Affirmative Action on Targeted and Non-Targeted Students: Evidence from Low-income Priorities in Paris High Schools, written with Julien Grenet and Yinghua He

    Abstract : Since 2008, school choice in Paris has an income-based affirmative action component giving low-income students preferential treatment in high school admissions. This policy is implemented through a centralized school choice process that assigns students to public schools. Students' priorities are determined by a point system that takes into account students' academic performance and their district of residence. Low-income students, who make up about 20 percent of high school freshmen, receive in addition a large bonus that gives them full priority at all public high schools in their district. Using comprehensive administrative data, we use the implementation of this bonus in 2008 as a natural experiment to examine the effects of income-based affirmative action on high school outcomes and college access for both targeted and non-targeted students.

    Location:

    Oct
    15

    Homepage

    Title ; The Effect of Affirmative Action on Targeted and Non-Targeted Students: Evidence from Low-income Priorities in Paris High Schools, written with Julien Grenet and Yinghua He

    Abstract : Since 2008, school choice in Paris has an income-based affirmative action component giving low-income students preferential treatment in high school admissions. This policy is implemented through a centralized school choice process that assigns students to public schools. Students' priorities are determined by a point system that takes into account students' academic performance and their district of residence. Low-income students, who make up about 20 percent of high school freshmen, receive in addition a large bonus that gives them full priority at all public high schools in their district. Using comprehensive administrative data, we use the implementation of this bonus in 2008 as a natural experiment to examine the effects of income-based affirmative action on high school outcomes and college access for both targeted and non-targeted students.

    Gabrielle Fack, PSE

    Tuesday, 14:00 - 15:15

    Location:

29 October 2024
  • Christian Basteck,WZB
    29 Oct, 14:00 - 15:30

    Homepage

    Title : An Axiomatization of the Random Priority Rule

    Abstract : We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive one object. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial Dictatorship, is the only mechanism that satisfies (i) fairness in the sense of equal-treatment-of-equals, (ii) ex post efficiency, and (iii) probabilistic (Maskin) monotonicity -- whenever preferences change so that a given deterministic assignment is ranked weakly higher by all agents, the probability of that assignment being chosen should be weakly larger. Probabilistic monotonicity implies strategy-proofness for random assignment problems and is equivalent on a general social choice domain; for deterministic rules it coincides with Maskin monotonicity.

    Location: R42.2.113

    Oct
    29

    Homepage

    Title : An Axiomatization of the Random Priority Rule

    Abstract : We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive one object. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial Dictatorship, is the only mechanism that satisfies (i) fairness in the sense of equal-treatment-of-equals, (ii) ex post efficiency, and (iii) probabilistic (Maskin) monotonicity -- whenever preferences change so that a given deterministic assignment is ranked weakly higher by all agents, the probability of that assignment being chosen should be weakly larger. Probabilistic monotonicity implies strategy-proofness for random assignment problems and is equivalent on a general social choice domain; for deterministic rules it coincides with Maskin monotonicity.

    Christian Basteck,WZB

    Tuesday, 14:00 - 15:30

    Location: R42.2.113

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