Calendar

September 2024

Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun
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  • Patrick Legros' Retirement Workshop
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Tuesday, 08 October 2024
  • Alexandros Theloudis, Tilburg
    08 Oct, 14:00 - 15:30

    Location: R42.2.113

    Oct
    08

    Alexandros Theloudis, Tilburg

    Tuesday, 14:00 - 15:30

    Location: R42.2.113

Thursday, 10 October 2024
  • Natalia Ramondo ,Boston University 
    10 Oct, 16:30 - 18:00

    Location:

    Oct
    10

    Natalia Ramondo ,Boston University 

    Thursday, 16:30 - 18:00

    Location:

Friday, 11 October 2024
  • Jonathan Riberth, ENTER-TSE
    11 Oct, 12:15 - 13:30

    Location:

    Oct
    11

    Jonathan Riberth, ENTER-TSE

    Friday, 12:15 - 13:30

    Location:

Tuesday, 15 October 2024
  • Gabrielle Fack, PSE
    15 Oct, 14:00 - 15:15

    Homepage

    Title ; The Effect of Affirmative Action on Targeted and Non-Targeted Students: Evidence from Low-income Priorities in Paris High Schools, written with Julien Grenet and Yinghua He

    Abstract : Since 2008, school choice in Paris has an income-based affirmative action component giving low-income students preferential treatment in high school admissions. This policy is implemented through a centralized school choice process that assigns students to public schools. Students' priorities are determined by a point system that takes into account students' academic performance and their district of residence. Low-income students, who make up about 20 percent of high school freshmen, receive in addition a large bonus that gives them full priority at all public high schools in their district. Using comprehensive administrative data, we use the implementation of this bonus in 2008 as a natural experiment to examine the effects of income-based affirmative action on high school outcomes and college access for both targeted and non-targeted students.

    Location:

    Oct
    15

    Homepage

    Title ; The Effect of Affirmative Action on Targeted and Non-Targeted Students: Evidence from Low-income Priorities in Paris High Schools, written with Julien Grenet and Yinghua He

    Abstract : Since 2008, school choice in Paris has an income-based affirmative action component giving low-income students preferential treatment in high school admissions. This policy is implemented through a centralized school choice process that assigns students to public schools. Students' priorities are determined by a point system that takes into account students' academic performance and their district of residence. Low-income students, who make up about 20 percent of high school freshmen, receive in addition a large bonus that gives them full priority at all public high schools in their district. Using comprehensive administrative data, we use the implementation of this bonus in 2008 as a natural experiment to examine the effects of income-based affirmative action on high school outcomes and college access for both targeted and non-targeted students.

    Gabrielle Fack, PSE

    Tuesday, 14:00 - 15:15

    Location:

Friday, 18 October 2024
  • Alexandre Mendoça, ENTER
    18 Oct, 12:15 - 13:30

    Location:

    Oct
    18

    Alexandre Mendoça, ENTER

    Friday, 12:15 - 13:30

    Location:

Saturday, 26 October 2024
  • Campbell Leith ,University of Glasgow
    26 Oct, 16:30 - 18:00

    Dear colleagues,

    Please find attached the invitation to the next Joint Seminar in Macroeconomics by Campbell Leith (University of Glasgow).

    on

    Central Bank Independence, Government Debt and the Re-Normalization of Interest Rates
    (co-authored with Tatiana Kirsanova and Ding Liu)

    The seminar will take place on Thursday, September 26th from 16:30 until 18:00 in the meeting room on the 3rd floor of the office building at Place Sainte-Gudule 19, 1000 Brussels* and will also be able to be followed via a Microsoft Teams meeting.

    * Please note that due to office renovations, the seminar will take place at a slightly different location. We kindly ask you to report to the front desk at Place Sainte-Gudule 19 - Sinter-Goedeleplein 19, next to the cathedral.

    We hope that you will circulate this invitation to your colleagues.

    Please reply by email to nbbmacro.seminar@nbb.be if you wish to participate to this seminar or if you want to have an appointment with the speaker.

    Please let us know if you will be physically present or will be following online by Teams. After registration and if you have indicated that you want to join online you will receive a confirmation email with the link to the seminar.

    Looking forward to seeing you there.

    Kind regards,

    Pierrick Clerc (ULiège), Ferre De Graeve (KU Leuven), Romain Houssa (UNamur), Robert Kollmann (ULB), Yasin Kursat Önder (UGent), Luca Pensieroso (UCLouvain) and Raf Wouters (NBB)

    Location:

    Oct
    26

    Dear colleagues,

    Please find attached the invitation to the next Joint Seminar in Macroeconomics by Campbell Leith (University of Glasgow).

    on

    Central Bank Independence, Government Debt and the Re-Normalization of Interest Rates
    (co-authored with Tatiana Kirsanova and Ding Liu)

    The seminar will take place on Thursday, September 26th from 16:30 until 18:00 in the meeting room on the 3rd floor of the office building at Place Sainte-Gudule 19, 1000 Brussels* and will also be able to be followed via a Microsoft Teams meeting.

    * Please note that due to office renovations, the seminar will take place at a slightly different location. We kindly ask you to report to the front desk at Place Sainte-Gudule 19 - Sinter-Goedeleplein 19, next to the cathedral.

    We hope that you will circulate this invitation to your colleagues.

    Please reply by email to nbbmacro.seminar@nbb.be if you wish to participate to this seminar or if you want to have an appointment with the speaker.

    Please let us know if you will be physically present or will be following online by Teams. After registration and if you have indicated that you want to join online you will receive a confirmation email with the link to the seminar.

    Looking forward to seeing you there.

    Kind regards,

    Pierrick Clerc (ULiège), Ferre De Graeve (KU Leuven), Romain Houssa (UNamur), Robert Kollmann (ULB), Yasin Kursat Önder (UGent), Luca Pensieroso (UCLouvain) and Raf Wouters (NBB)

    Campbell Leith ,University of Glasgow

    Saturday, 16:30 - 18:00

    Location:

Tuesday, 29 October 2024
  • Christian Basteck,WZB
    29 Oct, 14:00 - 15:30

    Homepage

    Title : An Axiomatization of the Random Priority Rule

    Abstract : We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive one object. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial Dictatorship, is the only mechanism that satisfies (i) fairness in the sense of equal-treatment-of-equals, (ii) ex post efficiency, and (iii) probabilistic (Maskin) monotonicity -- whenever preferences change so that a given deterministic assignment is ranked weakly higher by all agents, the probability of that assignment being chosen should be weakly larger. Probabilistic monotonicity implies strategy-proofness for random assignment problems and is equivalent on a general social choice domain; for deterministic rules it coincides with Maskin monotonicity.

    Location: R42.2.113

    Oct
    29

    Homepage

    Title : An Axiomatization of the Random Priority Rule

    Abstract : We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive one object. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial Dictatorship, is the only mechanism that satisfies (i) fairness in the sense of equal-treatment-of-equals, (ii) ex post efficiency, and (iii) probabilistic (Maskin) monotonicity -- whenever preferences change so that a given deterministic assignment is ranked weakly higher by all agents, the probability of that assignment being chosen should be weakly larger. Probabilistic monotonicity implies strategy-proofness for random assignment problems and is equivalent on a general social choice domain; for deterministic rules it coincides with Maskin monotonicity.

    Christian Basteck,WZB

    Tuesday, 14:00 - 15:30

    Location: R42.2.113

Thursday, 31 October 2024
  • Philipp Gersing, University of Vienna
    31 Oct, 12:00 - 13:00

    Location: R42.2.113

    Oct
    31

    Philipp Gersing, University of Vienna

    Thursday, 12:00 - 13:00

    Location: R42.2.113

Friday, 01 November 2024
  • ULB Closed
    01 Nov, 00:00 - 23:59

    Location:

    Nov
    01

    ULB Closed

Saturday, 02 November 2024
  • ULB Closed
    02 Nov, 00:00 - 23:59

    Location:

    Nov
    02

    ULB Closed