Calendar

October 2024

Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
  • Alexandros Theloudis, Tilburg
9
10
  • Natalia Ramondo ,Boston University 
11
  • Jonatan Riberth, ENTER-TSE
12
13
14
15
  • Gabrielle Fack, PSE
16
17
18
  • Alexandre Mendoça, ENTER
19
20
21
22
  • TSE – UC3 – ULB – BSE – AALTO Energy Workshop
23
24
25
26
  • Campbell Leith ,University of Glasgow
27
28
29
  • Christian Basteck,WZB
30
31
  • Philipp Gersing, University of Vienna
Tuesday, 15 October 2024
  • Gabrielle Fack, PSE
    15 Oct, 14:00 - 15:15

    Homepage

    Title ; The Effect of Affirmative Action on Targeted and Non-Targeted Students: Evidence from Low-income Priorities in Paris High Schools, written with Julien Grenet and Yinghua He

    Abstract : Since 2008, school choice in Paris has an income-based affirmative action component giving low-income students preferential treatment in high school admissions. This policy is implemented through a centralized school choice process that assigns students to public schools. Students' priorities are determined by a point system that takes into account students' academic performance and their district of residence. Low-income students, who make up about 20 percent of high school freshmen, receive in addition a large bonus that gives them full priority at all public high schools in their district. Using comprehensive administrative data, we use the implementation of this bonus in 2008 as a natural experiment to examine the effects of income-based affirmative action on high school outcomes and college access for both targeted and non-targeted students.

    Location: R42.2.113

    Oct
    15

    Homepage

    Title ; The Effect of Affirmative Action on Targeted and Non-Targeted Students: Evidence from Low-income Priorities in Paris High Schools, written with Julien Grenet and Yinghua He

    Abstract : Since 2008, school choice in Paris has an income-based affirmative action component giving low-income students preferential treatment in high school admissions. This policy is implemented through a centralized school choice process that assigns students to public schools. Students' priorities are determined by a point system that takes into account students' academic performance and their district of residence. Low-income students, who make up about 20 percent of high school freshmen, receive in addition a large bonus that gives them full priority at all public high schools in their district. Using comprehensive administrative data, we use the implementation of this bonus in 2008 as a natural experiment to examine the effects of income-based affirmative action on high school outcomes and college access for both targeted and non-targeted students.

    Gabrielle Fack, PSE

    Tuesday, 14:00 - 15:15

    Location: R42.2.113

Friday, 18 October 2024
  • Alexandre Mendoça, ENTER
    18 Oct, 12:15 - 13:30

    Location: R42.2.113

    Oct
    18

    Alexandre Mendoça, ENTER

    Friday, 12:15 - 13:30

    Location: R42.2.113

Tuesday, 22 October 2024
  • TSE – UC3 – ULB – BSE – AALTO Energy Workshop
    22 Oct, 00:00 - 23:59

    Location:

    Oct
    22

    TSE – UC3 – ULB – BSE – AALTO Energy Workshop

    Tuesday, 00:00 - 23:59

    Location:

Saturday, 26 October 2024
  • Campbell Leith ,University of Glasgow
    26 Oct, 16:30 - 18:00

    Dear colleagues,

    Please find attached the invitation to the next Joint Seminar in Macroeconomics by Campbell Leith (University of Glasgow).

    on

    Central Bank Independence, Government Debt and the Re-Normalization of Interest Rates
    (co-authored with Tatiana Kirsanova and Ding Liu)

    The seminar will take place on Thursday, September 26th from 16:30 until 18:00 in the meeting room on the 3rd floor of the office building at Place Sainte-Gudule 19, 1000 Brussels* and will also be able to be followed via a Microsoft Teams meeting.

    * Please note that due to office renovations, the seminar will take place at a slightly different location. We kindly ask you to report to the front desk at Place Sainte-Gudule 19 - Sinter-Goedeleplein 19, next to the cathedral.

    We hope that you will circulate this invitation to your colleagues.

    Please reply by email to nbbmacro.seminar@nbb.be if you wish to participate to this seminar or if you want to have an appointment with the speaker.

    Please let us know if you will be physically present or will be following online by Teams. After registration and if you have indicated that you want to join online you will receive a confirmation email with the link to the seminar.

    Looking forward to seeing you there.

    Kind regards,

    Pierrick Clerc (ULiège), Ferre De Graeve (KU Leuven), Romain Houssa (UNamur), Robert Kollmann (ULB), Yasin Kursat Önder (UGent), Luca Pensieroso (UCLouvain) and Raf Wouters (NBB)

    Location:

    Oct
    26

    Dear colleagues,

    Please find attached the invitation to the next Joint Seminar in Macroeconomics by Campbell Leith (University of Glasgow).

    on

    Central Bank Independence, Government Debt and the Re-Normalization of Interest Rates
    (co-authored with Tatiana Kirsanova and Ding Liu)

    The seminar will take place on Thursday, September 26th from 16:30 until 18:00 in the meeting room on the 3rd floor of the office building at Place Sainte-Gudule 19, 1000 Brussels* and will also be able to be followed via a Microsoft Teams meeting.

    * Please note that due to office renovations, the seminar will take place at a slightly different location. We kindly ask you to report to the front desk at Place Sainte-Gudule 19 - Sinter-Goedeleplein 19, next to the cathedral.

    We hope that you will circulate this invitation to your colleagues.

    Please reply by email to nbbmacro.seminar@nbb.be if you wish to participate to this seminar or if you want to have an appointment with the speaker.

    Please let us know if you will be physically present or will be following online by Teams. After registration and if you have indicated that you want to join online you will receive a confirmation email with the link to the seminar.

    Looking forward to seeing you there.

    Kind regards,

    Pierrick Clerc (ULiège), Ferre De Graeve (KU Leuven), Romain Houssa (UNamur), Robert Kollmann (ULB), Yasin Kursat Önder (UGent), Luca Pensieroso (UCLouvain) and Raf Wouters (NBB)

    Campbell Leith ,University of Glasgow

    Saturday, 16:30 - 18:00

    Location:

Tuesday, 29 October 2024
  • Christian Basteck,WZB
    29 Oct, 14:00 - 15:30

    Homepage

    Title : An Axiomatization of the Random Priority Rule

    Abstract : We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive one object. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial Dictatorship, is the only mechanism that satisfies (i) fairness in the sense of equal-treatment-of-equals, (ii) ex post efficiency, and (iii) probabilistic (Maskin) monotonicity -- whenever preferences change so that a given deterministic assignment is ranked weakly higher by all agents, the probability of that assignment being chosen should be weakly larger. Probabilistic monotonicity implies strategy-proofness for random assignment problems and is equivalent on a general social choice domain; for deterministic rules it coincides with Maskin monotonicity.

    Location: R42.2.113

    Oct
    29

    Homepage

    Title : An Axiomatization of the Random Priority Rule

    Abstract : We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive one object. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial Dictatorship, is the only mechanism that satisfies (i) fairness in the sense of equal-treatment-of-equals, (ii) ex post efficiency, and (iii) probabilistic (Maskin) monotonicity -- whenever preferences change so that a given deterministic assignment is ranked weakly higher by all agents, the probability of that assignment being chosen should be weakly larger. Probabilistic monotonicity implies strategy-proofness for random assignment problems and is equivalent on a general social choice domain; for deterministic rules it coincides with Maskin monotonicity.

    Christian Basteck,WZB

    Tuesday, 14:00 - 15:30

    Location: R42.2.113

Thursday, 31 October 2024
  • Philipp Gersing, University of Vienna
    31 Oct, 12:00 - 13:00

    Location: R42.2.113

    Oct
    31

    Philipp Gersing, University of Vienna

    Thursday, 12:00 - 13:00

    Location: R42.2.113

Friday, 01 November 2024
  • ULB Closed
    01 Nov, 00:00 - 23:59

    Location:

    Nov
    01

    ULB Closed

Saturday, 02 November 2024
  • ULB Closed
    02 Nov, 00:00 - 23:59

    Location:

    Nov
    02

    ULB Closed

Tuesday, 05 November 2024
  • Andre Groeger,BSE
    05 Nov, 14:00 - 15:30

    Homepage 

    Title  : The Dynamics of Agricultural Production

    Abstract : Agricultural productivity is low in rural economies compared to that of developed economies, and there is disparity in measured productivity across farms. The dispersion of measured productivity might reflect (i) volatile conditions and (ii) sluggish adjustments in agricultural production to such conditions, e.g., due to market frictions or technological constraints. This paper sheds light on the existence and nature of such imperfect adjustments by measuring the adjustment of production (factors, inputs and cropping patterns) to large shocks affecting the returns to different crops, and by estimating a dynamic structural model of farm production. We use the model to quantify the extent to which market frictions and technological constraints respectively limit the ability of farmers to adjust their production to changing conditions. We find that both technological and market frictions are quantitatively relevant, the latter implying that a significant part of sluggish adjustments can be interpreted as misallocation in factors and in cropping patterns

    Location: R42.2.113

    Nov
    05

    Homepage 

    Title  : The Dynamics of Agricultural Production

    Abstract : Agricultural productivity is low in rural economies compared to that of developed economies, and there is disparity in measured productivity across farms. The dispersion of measured productivity might reflect (i) volatile conditions and (ii) sluggish adjustments in agricultural production to such conditions, e.g., due to market frictions or technological constraints. This paper sheds light on the existence and nature of such imperfect adjustments by measuring the adjustment of production (factors, inputs and cropping patterns) to large shocks affecting the returns to different crops, and by estimating a dynamic structural model of farm production. We use the model to quantify the extent to which market frictions and technological constraints respectively limit the ability of farmers to adjust their production to changing conditions. We find that both technological and market frictions are quantitatively relevant, the latter implying that a significant part of sluggish adjustments can be interpreted as misallocation in factors and in cropping patterns

    Andre Groeger,BSE

    Tuesday, 14:00 - 15:30

    Location: R42.2.113

Friday, 08 November 2024
  • Antonino Varde,UNICATT
    08 Nov, 12:15 - 13:30

    Location:

    Nov
    08

    Antonino Varde,UNICATT

    Friday, 12:15 - 13:30

    Location: