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Thomas Baudin, IESEG
Thomas Baudin, IESEG
11 Mar, 14:00 - 15:30
Ttitle : Migration policy backlash, identity, \& integration of second-gen. migrants in France.
Abstract : Do integration policies that require migrants to demonstrate allegiance lead to more or less integration into the host society? In this paper, we study the effects of a symbolic change in birthright citizenship rules in France on the identity and the integration of second-generation immigrants. We exploit an exogenous reform that required second-generation immigrants to declare their willingness to become French as a condition to naturalize. Adopting a Difference-in-Differences approach, we show that, contrary to its stated aim of fostering a greater sense of belonging, this symbolic policy led to a loss of national identity and an increase in perceptions of discrimination among the target group. We document that these effects are not driven by changes in naturalization rates or an increased general hostility. We also show that while the reform did not affect their economic or political integration, it did reduce their cultural integration. Overall, rather than promoting integration, such migration policies can lead to a backlash.
Location: R42.113
Ttitle : Migration policy backlash, identity, \& integration of second-gen. migrants in France.
Abstract : Do integration policies that require migrants to demonstrate allegiance lead to more or less integration into the host society? In this paper, we study the effects of a symbolic change in birthright citizenship rules in France on the identity and the integration of second-generation immigrants. We exploit an exogenous reform that required second-generation immigrants to declare their willingness to become French as a condition to naturalize. Adopting a Difference-in-Differences approach, we show that, contrary to its stated aim of fostering a greater sense of belonging, this symbolic policy led to a loss of national identity and an increase in perceptions of discrimination among the target group. We document that these effects are not driven by changes in naturalization rates or an increased general hostility. We also show that while the reform did not affect their economic or political integration, it did reduce their cultural integration. Overall, rather than promoting integration, such migration policies can lead to a backlash.
Thomas Baudin, IESEG
Tuesday, 14:00 - 15:30
Location: R42.113
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Sergey Popov
Sergey Popov
18 Mar, 14:00 - 15:30
Location:
Sergey Popov
Tuesday, 14:00 - 15:30
Location:
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Luigi Pistaferri, Stanford
Luigi Pistaferri, Stanford
25 Mar, 14:00 - 15:30
Title : Marriage, Assortative Mating and Wealth Inequality*
Abstract : We use population data on capital income and wealth holdings for Norway to measureasset positions and wealth returns before individuals marry and after the householdis formed. These data allow us to establish a number of novel facts. First, individuals sort on personal wealth rather than parents’ wealth. Assortative mating on ownwealth dominates, and in fact renders assortative mating on parental wealth statistically insignificant. Second, people match also on their personal returns to wealthand assortative mating on returns is as strong as that on wealth. Third, post-marriagereturns on family wealth are largely explained by the return of the spouse with thehighest pre-marriage return. This suggests that family wealth is largely managed bythe spouse with the highest potential to grow it. This is particularly true for householdsat the top of the wealth distribution at marriage, providing a microfoundation for thescale dependence in wealth returns documented in several empirical papers. Fourth,marriage lowers the heterogeneity in returns as well as the degree of wealth inequalityrelative to the counterfactual case of no marriages. We use a simple analytical exampleto illustrate how the inequality attenuating role of marriage is affected by assortative mating on wealth and returns and wealth management task allocation betweenspouses.
Location: R42.2.113
Title : Marriage, Assortative Mating and Wealth Inequality*
Abstract : We use population data on capital income and wealth holdings for Norway to measureasset positions and wealth returns before individuals marry and after the householdis formed. These data allow us to establish a number of novel facts. First, individuals sort on personal wealth rather than parents’ wealth. Assortative mating on ownwealth dominates, and in fact renders assortative mating on parental wealth statistically insignificant. Second, people match also on their personal returns to wealthand assortative mating on returns is as strong as that on wealth. Third, post-marriagereturns on family wealth are largely explained by the return of the spouse with thehighest pre-marriage return. This suggests that family wealth is largely managed bythe spouse with the highest potential to grow it. This is particularly true for householdsat the top of the wealth distribution at marriage, providing a microfoundation for thescale dependence in wealth returns documented in several empirical papers. Fourth,marriage lowers the heterogeneity in returns as well as the degree of wealth inequalityrelative to the counterfactual case of no marriages. We use a simple analytical exampleto illustrate how the inequality attenuating role of marriage is affected by assortative mating on wealth and returns and wealth management task allocation betweenspouses.
Luigi Pistaferri, Stanford
Tuesday, 14:00 - 15:30
Location: R42.2.113
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Meredith Crowley, Cambridge
Meredith Crowley, Cambridge
28 Mar, 12:15 - 13:30
Location: R42.2.103
Meredith Crowley, Cambridge
Friday, 12:15 - 13:30
Location: R42.2.103
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