Calendar

Title: Targeting Viewers' Heterogeneous Ad Aversion: Evidence from a Two-Sided Market

Abstract:
This paper studies the role of viewers' heterogeneous ad aversion on media-content demand and advertisers' willingness to pay. We first illustrate the potential selection challenges of using market level data to estimate viewers' demand for content and average ad elasticity. We find that ad elasticity varies considerably by content type; however this could be due to heterogeneous individuals self-selecting into particular content. To address this problem we exploit minute-level data on individual choices to estimate viewers' heterogeneous ad aversion adapting the demand model in Dubois et al.(2020) to media content. Using high-frequency individual level data from free-to-air TV permits us to observe viewers' minute level choices from the consideration set of alternatives.
With this approach we prioritize estimating heterogeneous preferences without placing distributional assumptions on individuals' ad aversion or on how it correlates with observable demographic characteristics. We find that ad aversion is highly heterogeneous and not strongly correlated with observable socioeconomic characteristics such as socio-economic status or gender. We can also disentangle ad aversion from cohort preferences for content and idiosyncratic inertia/state dependence, which are relevant also for the advertisers' side of the market.
Our findings indicate that advertisers' willingness to pay per impression is positively associated with the content's ability to reach audiences with high ad aversion.
We find robust evidence of a per-impression price premium for ad slots that target individuals with higher levels of ad aversion.

Dear all,

Please find attached the invitation to the next Joint Seminar in Macroeconomics by Michele Modugno (Federal Reserve).

on

Decoding Equity Market Reactions to Macroeconomic News
(co-authored with Dino Palazzo)

The seminar will take exceptionally place on Tuesday, December 3^rd from 16:30 until 18:00 in the meeting room on the 1st floor of the office building at Place Sainte-Gudule 19, 1000 Brussels* and will also be able to be followed via a Microsoft Teams meeting.

* Please note that due to office renovations, the seminar will take place at a slightly different location. We kindly ask you to report to the front desk at Place Sainte-Gudule 19 - Sinter-Goedeleplein 19, next to the cathedral.

We hope that you will circulate this invitation to your colleagues.

Please reply by email to nbbmacro.seminar@nbb.be if you wish to participate to this seminar or if you want to have an appointment with the speaker.

Please let us know if you will be physically present or will be following online by Teams. After registration and if you have indicated that you want to join online you will receive a confirmation email with the link to the seminar.

Looking forward to seeing you there.

Kind regards,

Pierrick Clerc (ULiège), Ferre De Graeve (KU Leuven), Romain Houssa (UNamur), Robert Kollmann (ULB), Yasin Kursat Önder (UGent), Luca Pensieroso (UCLouvain) and Raf Wouters (NBB)

title : Mobilization and Intra-Party Power Sharing:Theory and Evidence from Norway
abstract : Despite their recognized importance, the inherent opacity of intraparty institutions limits scholarly understanding of how parties share power internally. We advance knowledgein this area by studying how parties allocate list positions to different factions. We develop a theory of intraparty bargaining in which list positions shape the mobilizationefforts of party activists in different factions. Our results allow us to link observablepatterns in list allocations to the importance of consensus in intraparty negotiations.We empirically evaluate these predictions using data from Norwegian municipal elections. We exploit a wave of municipal mergers to identify candidates’ geography-basedfactional affiliations. In line with our theory’s functionalist logic and consensus-basedbargaining, smaller factions are over-compensated in “safe” list positions. While we alsofind a slight over-representation in the contested ranks, the relationship between sizeand resources is much closer to proportionality, as predicted by our theory.Keywords: Geographic Representation, Intra-party Politics, Municipal Mergers.